We present lower bounds on the eficiency of constructions for Pseudo-Random Generators (PRGs) 
Introduction
Since the seminal paper by Diffie and Hellman [DH78] modern cryptography has been based on the concept of oneway functions. Informally a function f : A B is oneway if given y = f(3:) for 3: chosen at random in A it is hard to compute any preimage of y. We do not know if one-way functions exists (their existence would imply that P # N P ) but there are some candidate functions based on number-theoretic problems (like factoring and the discrete logarithm) which are widely believed to be one-way.
In the twenty-plus years since [DH78], one major direction of research in cryptography has been to try to construct cryptographic primitives based on the weakest possible Luca Trevisan UC Berkeley luca@cs.berkeley.edu computational assumption. Under the existence of one-way functions we know how to prove the existence of universal one-way hash functions and digital signatures [NY89, Rom901, , pseudorandom function ensembles [GGM86, HILL991 and commitment schemes [Nao91, HILL991.
These constructions are very important from a theoretical point of view because they are based on the minimal complexity assumption required to have cryptography. On the other hand, however, their practical impact is very limited because of their inefficiency. In practice, constructions based on stronger assumptions (such as the hardness of a specific number-theoretic problem) might be much more attractive from an efficiency point of view.
This trade-off between the efficiency of a cryptographic construction and the strength of the complexity assumption on which it relies is one of the most interesting features in modern cryptographic research. Attempts of improving the efficiency of known constructions based on general assumptions have mostly failed. It is thus an interesting question to ask: How efJicient can cryptographic constructions be when based on general assumptions?
In this paper we focus on constructions for universal one-way hash functions and pseudo-random bit generation (UOWHF and PRG for short in the following). For these primitives we provide lower-bounds on the efficiency of general constructions that match the efficiency of known schemes. Our lower bounds are expressed in the number of required invocations of a one-way permutation (since oneway permutations are a fortiori also one-way functions our lower bounds are stronger and clearly hold for functions as well).
Our Results
Informally, we say {O,l}n + {O,l}n has smaller than S inverts that a one-way permutation T : security S if any circuit A of size n with probability less than 1/S (for concreteness, one can think of S as a slightly superpolynomial function of n, such as nlog n, but our results hold for any choice of S). For an integer I, we also denote by U l the uniform distribution over (0, l}'. [Yao82] . They proved that PRG's can be constructed based on one-way permutations. This construction, using a later improvement by Goldreich and Levin [GL89], requires O ( k / log S ) invocations (see e.g. [Go195, Section 2.5.31 for more details), which is the best known bound for generic constructions.
We prove that this is essentially the best that can be achieved. That is, we prove that any construction of PRG's that stretches its input by k bits and is limited to black-box access to a one-way permutation 7r with security S must invoke it n ( k / log s) times.
UNIVERSAL ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTIONS. A UOWHF is a family of length-decreasing functions such that for any input z it is hard to find a collision with z for a function chosen randomly from the family. UOWHF's were introduced by Naor and Yung in [NY89] where they showed that they are sufficient to construct digital signature algorithm. In [NY89] it is shown how to construct UOWHF's from any one-way permutation. Later this was improved by Rompel in [Rom90] to one-way functions.
Regarding efficiency, the constructions in [NY89, Rom901 require at least one invocation of the one-way permutatiodfunction for every bit of length decrease. That is, if we have a one-way permutation 7r : (0, l}n + (0, l}n and we want to build a UOWHF family { h } where each h : (0, l}m+k + (0, l}m then the construction requires k invocation to 7r. This can be easily improved to O ( k / log S) invocations.
Here too, we prove that this is essentially the best that can be done. That is, we prove that any construction of UOWHF's that compresses its input by k bits and is limited to black-box access to a one-way permutation 7r with security S must invoke it n ( k / logs) times. results indicate that assuming the mere existence of oneway functions, or even permutations, is too weak of a computational hypothesis to obtain e@cient cryptographic primitives. As it will be evident from our proof techniques, the limitation stems from the fact that a permutation 7r may still be one-way with security S even if it hides only very few, say O(1og S), bits of its input (actually we use such "pathological" functions to prove our lower bounds).
Thus when designing new schemes with an eye out to efficiency, it is important to use stronger computational assumptions that provide us with many more "secure" bits for each invocation of the one-way function. An interesting research direction would be to try to find the most general DISCUSSION AND REMAINING OPEN PROBLEMS. Our assumption which still allows for efficient schemes.
For the case of PRG's, for example, we know that we can have efficient constructions if we assume the existence of a one-way function with n(n) hard-core bits (an example of such a function can be found in [HSS93] ). Similarly, we know that semantically secure encryption can be implemented efficiently with a trapdoor permutation that hides many bits (none of the "classic" trapdoor permutations has this property, although recently [CGOO] present some candidates based on non-standard number theoretic problems). But if we look at encryption schemes secure against active attacks, we only know how to construct an efficient scheme based on a specific number-theoretic assumption (the Cramer-Shoup scheme [CS98] which is based on the so-called Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption).
An interesting question is to try to come up with an efficient encryption scheme secure against active attacks based on a "generic" assumption on trapdoor functions (say a trapdoor permutation that hides n(n) bits). Another interesting question would be to determine a lower bound on the number of invocations to any trapdoor permutation in order to achieve even simple semantic security.
Overview of our techniques
We prove our results in an extension of the model of Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89] . Informally (see Section 2 for a more detailed discussion on the models) Impagliazzo and Rudich proved that a construction of secure key exchange based solely on one-way functions must "contain" a proof that P # N P .
Similarly, we show that a secure construction of PRG (or UOWHF) that makes less than a certain number of queries to a one-way permutation black box, must contain a proof that P # N P . In fact we prove an even stronger consequence: if a secure construction of PRG (resp. [JOWHF) makes less than the required number of queries, then PRG (resp. UOWHF) exists unconditionally, i.e., can be constructed without accessing a one-way function or permutation.
The proof hinges on a technical lemma stating that a random permutation mapping t bits into t bits is, with high probability, one-way with security 2-"(t), even against non-uniform adversaries. For the related case of random functions, such a result has been proved by Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89] for the (much simpler) uniform case, and by Impagliazzo [Imp961 in the non-uniform case.'
Then we start from a secure construction G of a PRG (the case of UOWHF is similar although technically more complicated) with oracle access to a one-way permutation. We 'One could derive our result from Impagliazzo's proof and from the fact that a random function is indistinguishable from a random permutation. Anyway, our proof is quite different from Impagliazzo's, and a bit simpler.
run G with an oracle permutation that leaves n -O(1og S) of its input bits unchanged, and it is a random permutation on the remaining O(1ogS) bits. According to the above lemma, a permutation chosen according to this distribution is, with high probability, one-way with security S, and thus G is also secure.
We show that if the number of queries q to this oracle is "small" (i.e. less than k/O(logS), where k is the stretch of the generator G), then we can construct a different PRG GI, that takes as input the original seed s and q (distinct) random points in (0, 1}O('"gS) and simulates G by using the q points to answer G's queries to the oracle. GI is a generator, because if q is "small", then its input is shorter than its output. G' is secure because its output is the same as G and thus indistinguishable from random.
Notice that GI is unconditional, i.e., it does not need to access any one-way permutation. Thus we prove that if G makes a small number of queries, then we have a proof of the unconditional existence of PRG's (a corollary of which is that we have a proof that P # NP).
Prior Related Work
This research was motivated and inspired by recent work of Kim, Simon and Tetali [KST99] , who essentially initiated the study of efficiency limitations for cryptographic constructions.2
Our lower bounds on the complexity of UOWHF constructions improves on [KST99] , where a lower bound of n(&/ log S) on the number of invocations of a one-way permutation is proven. Our result is also qualitatively better, since it holds in a more general model (see Section 2 below for a discussion about the models in which such results can be stated). We do not know of any similar work for PRG's.
Previous negative result had focused more on impossibility results for the security of certain constructions rather than for their efficiency. Impagliazzo and Rudich in [IR89] give strong evidence that black-box access to one-way permutations cannot yield secure key exchange. In [Sim98] , Simon proves that one-way permutations are not sufficient to construct collision-resistant hash functions (which is a stronger primitive than UOWHF's). Finally a very recent result [KSSOO] shows that there is no construction of oneway permutations based on one-way functions.
2A somewhat different notion of efficiency was considered earlier by Rudich [Rud9i 1, who proved that for every k, there exists an oracle relative to which secret key exchange can be done in k rounds but not in k -1 rounds.
TheModels

Impagliazzo-Rudich, Black Boxes cles
The fundamental paper about impossibility and Orafor cryptographic constructions is [IR89] , and it is useful to start from there to motivate our definitions. The purpose of [IR89] was to prove that a certain kind of cryptographic construction was impossible. In this paper we are concerned with cryptographic constructions that are possible, and we are interested in their efficiency, but the difficulties in formalizing the question are similar.
More specifically, [IR89] was concerned with the question of whether key-exchange protocols based only on oneway functions exists. The difficulty in addressing this question is in the way of formalizing the notion of "being based on one-way functions." Intuitively, this should be formalized as the key exchange protocol being an oracle procedure that is given oracle access to a function. If the function is one-way then the protocol is secure. However if key exchange protocols exist, then there are key exchange protocols "based on one-way functions," that simply ignore the function given as an oracle (however, in order to prove the security of such a construction, one has to prove the possibility of key-exchange from scratch, which is beyond what we are able to prove with current techniques). So if one wants to prove that there is no key-exchange protocol based on one-way functions, one has to give a more restrictive definition, or to show that (as in the case above) the only way to make such a construction is by proving something that is beyond our current techniques.
T h e Impagliazzo-Rudich Approach. Impagliazzo and Rudich first restrict to "black-box'' constructions that are secure whenever the function given as an oracle is hard to invert (even if it is also hard to compute, and so does not satisfy the definition of being one-way). Then, they assume that P=NP. Under these assumptions, they prove that when a random function is used as an oracle in any key exchange protocol, then the protocol can be broken, even though a random function is (with high probability) hard to invert. It then follows that a proof of security of a "black-box" construction of a key-exchange protocol based on one-way functions must also contain a proof that P # NP, and so is beyond the reach of current techniques.
As we briefly mentioned in the introduction, we extend this model. But the proof methodology is basically identical. We show that a "black-box" construction of PRG which queries a random permutation oracle in too few places, may be transformed in a constructions that never queries the oracle at all. This yields the unconditional existence of PRG's, which is a result beyond the reach of current techniques (since it also implies P # NP).
Relativizations. In computational complexity theory there is a canonical way of showing that a certain result is seemingly beyond reach of current techniques, namely to show that the opposite result holds relative to an oracle. Impagliazzo and Rudich observe that their result can also be interpreted in this setting.
Comparison. The Impagliazzo-Rudich approach provides a black-box one-way function (in their case, a random function) and an adversary that breaks the construction when it uses the primitive. The adversary is implementable in polynomial time if P=NP. If one uses an oracle relative to which P=NP (e.g. an oracle for a PSPACE-complete problem), and one augments this oracle with the above blackbox one-way function, one gets an oracle relative to which a one-way function exist, yet the construction can be broken. Typically, then, an impossibility result in the ImpagliazzoRudich setting implies a relativized impossibility result, so that the Impagliazzo-Rudich setting is more general.
Among previous impossibility results, a very recent result showing that there is no construction of one-way permutations based on one-way functions [RudSS, KSSOO] is in the Impagliazzo-Rudich model, while other results are based on relativizations [Rud9 1, Sim98, KST991.
Model for Pseudorandom Generator Constructions
We say that a permutation T : (0, l}n + (0, l}n is (S, €)-one way if for every circuit A of size 5 S we have
To reduce the number of parameters, we will also say that a function is S-one way (or one-way with security S) if it is (S, l/S)-one way.
We say that a random variable X, ranging over (0, l } m is (S, €)-indistinguishable from uniform if for every circuit
A pseudorandom generator construction is an oracle procedure G(') : (0, l}m + (0, l}m+k that expects as an oracle a permutation n : (0, l}n + (0, l}n. We are interested in constructions where G is computable in time polynomial in m, n, IC and where the output of the generator is indistinguishable from uniform whenever the oracle permutation is a fixed one-way permutation, and the input of the generator is randomly generated.
In particular, we will say that G is a (S,, S,, 6 ) In Section 4 we show that if there is a (S,, S,, E) pseudorandom generator construction that uses less than k / 5 log S, accesses into the permutation, then it is possible to construct unconditionally a polynomial-time computable pseudorandom generator whose output is (S, , €)-indistinguishable from uniform. This means that, in particular, P#NP (as in the Impagliazzo-Rudich setting). It should be noted that our consequence is not only stronger than P#NP, but it is a "tight" consequence: it says that the only way to construct a pseudorandom generator based on a generic one-way permutation and that makes o(k/ log S) accesses into the permutation is to prove unconditionally that a pseudorandom generator can be constructed, thus dispensing with the use of one-way permutations altogether. It is as Impagliazzo and Rudich had proved that if there is a key-agreement protocol that uses a oneway function, then there is an unconditionally secure keyagreement protocol.
Model for Universal One-way Hash Function Constructions
Roughly speaking, a family of universal one way hash functions (abbreviated UOWHF) is a family 3t of functions having the same range and the same domain (the domain being smaller than the range) such that when wi: pick at random a function h from ' H and a point z from the domain, it is hard, given h and x, to find a point z' # x such that h(z) = h(x'). P#NP. Once more, our result falls in the ImpagliazzoRudich setting, but it has a stronger, and "tight," consequence.
H(s,x) = h,(z).
The Hardness of Inverting Random Permutations
In this section we prove that a random permutation is, with high probability, one-way with exponential security, even against non-uniform circuits. PROOF: Consider the set I of E N points on which A is able to invert T , after making at mostueries into T . We want to to argue that there exists a subset S I such that IS1 2 e N / ( q + 1) and such that the value of T-' in all the points of S is totally determined once we are given A, the sets S and 7r-l (S) and the value of T-' in all the points in We define S by the following process. Initially S is empty, and all elements of I are candidates for being an element of S. We take the lexicographically first element z out of I , and we put it into S. We simulate the computation A"(z), and let us call 21,. . . , zq the queries made by A (we assume wlog that they are different), and y1, . . . , yq the answers (i.e. yi = ~( z i ) ) .
If z is none of the answers, then we remove 31,. . . , yp from I . If z is one of the answers, say yi, then we remove y1, . . . , yi-1 from I . Then we take the lexicographically smallest of the remaining elements of I , we put it into S, etc. At any step of the construction of S, we add one element to S and we remove at most q elements from I . Since I has initially EN elements, in the end S has at least d V / ( q + 1) elements.
(Note: a way to picture the previous argument is to draw a directed graph with [NI nodes, where there is an edge [NI -S.
(z,y) if A"(z) makes a query z ' such that ~(z') = y.
In this graph, every vertex has out-degree at most q. We mark all vertices corresponding to elements of I . We want to find a subset S of I such that the only edges among elements of S go from nodes of higher lex order to nodes of lower lex order. A greedy algorithm will find an S such that
We now claim that given descriptions of the sets S and K-' (S), and given the values of K on [NI -K-' (S), and given A, it is possible to compute (or invert) T everywhere.
It is enough to show that it is possible to invert T everywhere. The values of K-' (z) for z fZ S are explicitly given. The values of K -' ( Z > for z E S can be reconstructed as follows (we should do the following reconstruction sequentially, for all z E S in lexicographic order). We simulate the computation of A"(z). By construction of S, A"(z) will make queries either in points not in T-' (S), or it will query T-'(z') where z' E S but 5' precedes z in lexicographic order, or, otherwise, A is querying K-' (z) itself. In the first two cases, we have enough information to continue the simulation. In the last case, it means that the current query is T-' (z). In all possible cases, we have enough information to reconstruct KIT-' (z).
In order to describe S, T-' (S), and T restricted to [NI -
where a = [SI. This completes the proof.
U
As a consequence, we have Theorem 2 For suficiently large t, i f we pick at random a permutation K : ( 0 , l}t + ( 0 , l}t, there is a probability at least 1 -2-2''2 that the permutation is one-way with security 2t/5.
IS1 L lIl/q.)
We note that it would be possible to prove that with comparably high probability the permutation has security about (2.34) . 2t/4. The weaker expression 2t/5 is easier to use in our application, so we did not try to optimize. For each parameter t < n we denote with IIt," the following subset of the family of permutations over n-bits:
A corollary to Theorem 2 is that if t = 5 log S,, then for any n > t, 7r E R IIt,, is one-way with security S, with very high probability.
Corollary 3 For suficiently large t, for any n > t, if we picka randompermutation 7r : (0,l)" + (0, 1)" in IIt,", then with probability bigger than 1 -2-2t/2, the permutation 7r is one-way with security 2t/5.
Lower Bound for Pseudo-Random Generators
In this section we show our lower bound for PRG constructions. We start from such a PRG construction G(') (.) that expects as an oracle a permutation 7r : ( 0 , 1)" + (O,l}*.
We assume that G stretches an m-bit seed into
Suppose that G is a provable construction such that if 7r is S,-hard then G is secure; we prove that unless G queries 7r in at least R(k/ log S,) places, it is possible to derive from G an unconditional pseudorandom generator.
The basic idea of the proof is as follows. If G queries only few points in the oracle we can encode the answers in the seed of a new PRG, G' : {0,1}"' + (0, l}m+k, which will be able to "simulate" a computation of G when it is fed with a random permutation oracle. Notice that G' does not use any oracle at all. We then use Theorem 2 to claim that a random permutation oracle is indeed hard to invert by a circuit of size S, even when its range is t = O(logS,).
Thus with this oracle the outputs of G and consequently G' are indistinguishable from random. The desired bound comes from the fact that G' is still a "stretching" generator provided that m' is smaller than m + k. But m' < qt + m since qt bounds the number of bits needed to encode the tbits answers to G'suestions, plus one needs nz bits to encode the original seed of G. 
Fix a test T of size S,. Let t = 5 log S,. From Corollary 3 we know that a random permutation 7r E R IIt,n is S,-hard with probability larger than 1 -2-"/'. Recall that 7r operates only on the first t input bits, i.e. 7r is defined as ), b) where .i r is a random permutation over (0, l}t. Thus in other words
By an averaging argument this yields that Clearly the distribution of {G'(S')}~~ is identically distributed to { G " ( S ) } +~P~~,~;~ thus:
which ends the proof.
0
Lower Bound for One Way Hash Functions
In this section we show our lower bound for UOWHF constructions. The proof outline is similar to the one for the case of PRG's. We start from a UOWHF construction H(')(., a ) that expects as an oracle a permutation T :
(0, 1)" + (0, l}". We assume that H takes as input a Tbit key and compresses m + k-bit inputs into m-bit outputs.
If the construction makes a number q of accesses into the permutation such that q < k/5 log S (where S is the security of the permutation), then we show that it is possible to derive an unconditionally secure construction of UOWHF.
As in the case of PRG, we observe that H is unconditionally secure when the permutation T is chosen so that it randomly permutes the first 5 log S bits of the inputs, while leaving the remaining bits unchanged. We then show that this idealized setting can be realized by putting answers for theueries into the key (one needs about 5q log S bits to specify such answers, since only the relevant 5 log S bits of each answer have to be specified). Furthermore, we put in the output of our new hash function theueries (or rather, the first 5 log S bits of each such query) done during the computation. If q < k/5 log S we are still getting a length-decreasing function, and we are able to show that if an adversary can find collision in this new construction, then there is an adversary that finds collisions in the idealized setting, which we know is impossible. So we get an unconditionally secure construction of UOWHF. Let us define t = 5 log S,. For an element x E (0, l}", we call the string made up by the first t bits of x the t-pre@ of We will now define a stronger notion of collision for H. We say that z' is a strong collision for z with seed s and permutation T if z' # z, H"(s, z ) = H"(S, z') and the t-prefixes of theueries made during the computation of H"(s, z ) are the same as the t-prefixes of theueries made during the computation of H"(s, 2'). Clearly, for any adversary A of size 5 s h , and any permutation T of security S, we have Pr[A"(z, s, H X ( s ,
z' is strong collision for z with respect to s and 7r] 5 E After making a restriction on the definition of success, we now also make a restriction on the class of adversaries: instead of considering an adversary A that can access T arbitrarily, we consider adversaries that do not have oracle access to T, but are given the t-prefixes of the queries and answers during the computation of H" (s, z) . Since such restricted adversaries can be simulated by general adversaries with no overhead, we also have that for every permutation T of security S, and every A of size 5 s h Pr[A(z,s,H"(s,z),sl,. . . , zq, y1,. . . , yq) = z' : X.
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z' is strong collision for z with respect to s and 7r] 5 E where 2 1 , . . . , zq are the t-prefixes of theueries made to 7r during the computation of H"(s, z ) , and y1,. . . , yq are the t-prefixes of the respective answers.
Let now A be a fixed circuit of size 5 sh, and let us sample a random permutation 7r from the set IIt," (which we shorten with II in the following). With high probability, 
